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I. INTRODUCTION
In corporate law, the most litigated issue is piercing the corporate
veil.2 However, despite its active use, the underlying law is also one of the
least understood doctrines. Saying something significant and universally
true about the doctrine of veil piercing is similar to trying to nail 'Jell-O' to
the wall: it is a slippery, slightly messy prospect with a small chance of
getting it completely right. In 1926, Benjamin Cardozo remarked that veil
piercing is "enveloped in the mists of metaphor."4 Contemporary
commentators5 have been less kind, often referring to legal decisions to
pierce the corporate veil as "irreconcilable and not entirely
1 Enquip Technologies Group, Inc. v. Tycon Technoglass, No. 2008-CV-1276,
2009 WL 812155, at *22 (Ohio 2009) (citing Gary Portnoy & Judy Hart,
"According to Our New Arrivals," theme song to Mr. Belvedere (ABC Television
1985-1990), on the album Television's Greatest Hits, Vol. 6 (TVT Records 1996).
* Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
2 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1037 (1991).
3 Conducting a Westlaw survey of cases, by entering search terms "piercing the
corporate veil" and "disregard! the corporate entity" retuned over 8700 results
compared to a search of "corporate takeover" and "hostile takeover" which netted
only 1100 cases. Litigated cases may not serve as a truly representative sample of
all the corporate law disputes. However, the extent to which veil piercing remains
a heavy factual doctrine and therefore uncertain, contributes to the sheer number of
claims brought and ultimately fought out in a courtroom. See id. at 1046.
4 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94 (N.Y. 1926) (Judge Cardozo
explained: "The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary
corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in
law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end
often by enslaving it.").
5 Much of this scholarly work resulted in lists of theories and factors, further
complicating the application of veil piercing.
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comprehensible," 6 "defying any attempt at rational explanation,"7 and
transpiring "freakishly."8
Generally, it is the hallmark of corporations that the corporate
entity and its shareholders are separate.9 As separate entities, shareholders
are not liable directly for the actions of the corporation. In other words,
shareholders have limited liability - the shareholder can only lose the total
amount of the investment. ' There is no risk of personal liability. No matter
what misfortune falls on the corporation, creditors cannot use the personal
capital of shareholders to satisfy the outstanding debt. The doctrine of veil
piercing is an exception to the general rule of limited liability." Veil
piercing allows litigants to disregard the corporate entity to personally hold
shareholders responsible for corporate debts.12
However, the exception has taken on a life of its own. The doctrine
is hardly made up of solid rules or quantifiable tests which lead to easily
predictable outcomes: instead, most decisions describe the outer limits of
the doctrine by citing a formulaic test, followed by a laundry list of factors
other courts have considered significant in one manner or another, and
closing with a conclusory declaration stating the result with little
explanation. 3 Often the results are complicated by the fact that the same
details appear in both cases allowing and preventing relief "in an
unpatterned mingling of relevant with neutral facts that has stymied
constructive analysis."' 4
The doctrine of veil piercing in Ohio is similar to other states' veil
piercing doctrine. It is a diverse array of precedents, complicated, until
recently, by a rule split in the appellate districts. 5 In 2008, Dombroski v.
6 PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983).
7 Jonathan M. Landers, A Unfied Approach to Parent, Subsidiary & Affiliate
Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589, 620 (1975).
8 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability & the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 89 (1985).
9 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1037.
11 The doctrine of veil piercing can go by many names including the alter ego
doctrine, piercing the corporate veil, or disregarding the corporate entity.
12 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 6.22(b) (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/library/onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf ("Unless
otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is
not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may
become personally liable by reason of his own act or conduct.").
1 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 509
(2001).
14 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1037.
1s See Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ohio 2008).
2010 "There's a Change in the Status Quo": 317
Corporate Veil Piercing in Ohio after
Dombroski v. WellPoint
WellPoint reached the Ohio Supreme Court, forcing a resolution of the
issue and providing an opportunity for needed clarification.16 The court
cleared up some of the mist surrounding veil piercing, but voluntarily
injected some uncertainty into limited liability. Dombroski bolstered limited
liability by creating a stricter standard for parties seeking to pierce the
corporate veil but qualified it, leaving some questions unresolved.
Corporate veil piercing is a particular concern to small business
owners and entrepreneurs. Unlike other corporate law issues, veil piercing
is a remedy that poses a unique danger to corporations with a small number
of shareholders: the possibility of personal liability for business obligations.
Being stripped of the advantages of limited liability is the small business
owner's worst nightmare. It creates the possibility that the owner will not
only lose his or her sole source of livelihood, but also the home and other
personal assets.
This Note evaluates the evolution of the doctrine of veil piercing in
Ohio and its recent trends. Part II describes limited liability and the
theoretical foundations for veil piercing and explains why limited liability is
the default rule for corporations. Also, Part II details the typical tests
associated with veil piercing and where those tests are most consistent with
the theory of limited liability. Part III provides an overview of veil piercing
in Ohio, including the recent appellate district split and the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision in Dombroski. Part IV articulates how Dombroski
impacted corporate law in Ohio by providing more security for corporations
while adding a dash of uncertainty. The final part offers a conclusion as to
the state of corporate veil piercing in Ohio as well as constructive thoughts
on prospective business organization for practitioners.
II. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: WHY HAVE LIMITED LIABILITY?
One of the basic advantages of the corporate form is the ability to limit
the personal liability of the owners of a business. 7 A plaintiff cannot
directly sue an individual shareholder for the tortious activities or debts of
the business organization. 8 However, when certain requirements are met, it
is possible for a party in a lawsuit to dispense with the corporate entity and
allow the creditor to directly seek debt satisfaction from the shareholders of
1 id.
17 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 480.
1 id.
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a corporation.' 9 When a party successfully holds the shareholders liable, it
has pierced the corporate veil.
Veil piercing as an equitable remedy has received little academic
scrutiny as a general matter. Part of the reason behind the lack of interest is
the doctrine's general unpredictability. Rather than creating a system of
predictable outcomes where firms are able to assess risk and properly
allocate resources, veil piercing is perceived to be a virtual turkey shoot of
factors and variables.2 0 Businesses and legal practitioners are often left to
ponder the effectiveness of their risk allocation because the true test of a
corporation's limited liability occurs in the courtroom. The lack of strict
standards creates substantial costs to businesses and society as a whole as
firms engage in risk allocation that may be ultimately futile, as well as
wasting time, resources, and limiting the socially beneficial risks that firms
are willing to take.2'
Veil piercing is an exception to limited liability. Understanding this
exception to limited liability requires comprehending why limited liability
is the default rule. The theory behind limited liability informs the debate
about the application of veil piercing and demonstrates which cases are
outliers. Thorough theoretical knowledge helps cut through the misty
judicial language in veil piercing cases to predict when a court is willing to
disregard the corporate entity.
A. The Public Policy ofLimited Liability: Limiting Costs
Limited liability as an economic model creates the most efficient
ordering of business relationships. 22 The contractarian model views the
corporation as a nexus or web of contracts between the parties involved in
1 Generally to pierce the corporation's veil, a party must meet two elements: first,
the party must demonstrate control of the corporation. This first step is often called
the alter ego test since it attempts to demonstrate that the corporation is merely a
facade for the individual shareholder. The second step is articulated in a number of
different ways but usually requires some fraud, misrepresentation, or - in more
creditor-friendly states - the existence of unfairness. This note focuses on the
second step of the test. See, e.g., Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967).
20 Often when a judge is faced with piercing the corporate veil, the primary focus of
inquiry is on the particular parties involved and the fairness of the outcome. As a
result, the judge often devalues the abstract societal value of limited liability for
corporate shareholders. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 481.
21 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 481.
22 In 1918, Columbia University President Nicholas Murray remarked "I weigh my
words when I say that in my judgment, the limited liability of corporations is the
greatest single discovery of modem times ... Even steam and electricity are far
less important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced to
comparative impotence without it." Williams P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson,
Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PrrT. L. REv. 837, 841 (1982).
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23
creating the corporation. Essentially the corporation is not an entity, but a
long-term contract between various inputs.24 This web of relationships
created through explicit and implicit contracts between constituencies
makes up the corporation. For example, the shareholders of a corporation
provide equity capital and accept some risk of loss. The creditors provide
debt capital. Employees provide labor.25 These relationships make up the
legal fiction of the corporation.
Corporate law is made up of default rules.26 These rules are
standard because presumably most parties would contractually choose them
if the parties were to negotiate terms.27 Therefore, the standards that satisfy
the requirements of most parties are majoritarian defaults.28 Parties are free
to deviate from the majoritarian default rules when the rules are not ideal
for obtaining their objectives but most parties are allowed to reduce
transactional costs by selecting the default rule.29 Under the contractual
model, the primary guiding principal for rule formation is minimizing
23 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 485. The contractarian model actually post-dates
limited liability, but over the last few decades has become the leading theory.
There are a number of other theoretical models. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Foreword
to PRoGREssIvE CORPORATE LAW ix (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); William T.
Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1395, 1399 (1993); Brian R. Cheffins, Using Theory ofStudy Law: a Company
Law Perspective, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 197, 209 (1999). Two such models are the
agency model and the concession model. Concession theory proposes corporations
are the product of the state, not private enterprises. Since originally corporations
were created through specific legislative enactments and are still required by state
law to file for incorporation, some believed corporations were essentially the
product of the state. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liabilities and Theories of the
Corporation, 50 MD. L. REv. 80, 85-91 (1991). See also T. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). As essentially a state subsidized entity, limited
liability was considered a privilege the state could revoke. Bainbridge, supra note
13, at 496. However, the last fifty years had essentially debunked the theory by
pointing to the social benefits reaped through limited liability. Id. at 495. See also
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937 at 54 (1991).
The agency theory which holds shareholders liable as the principal for the actions
of its agent, the corporation. See Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966).
But generally, a corporation is not considered the agent of its shareholders.
24 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 485.25 d
26 Id. While corporate law is made up of some default rules, there are some that are
simply rules which parties cannot contract around.
27 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 486.28 Id. The idea behind default rules is to minimize transactional costs by choosing
the most widely useable rule which parties can select without incurring the costs of
negotiating for a different standard.29 d
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transactional costs. 3 0 If the goal is cost minimization, parties should be free
to choose whatever organization best facilitates that objective.
Limited liability is simply one of the default terms of the corporate
contract.3 ' For the majority of parties and situations, limited liability is the
most economically efficient form. As a result, it would be the bargained for
rule in nearly every context - for the shareholder, director, officer, and even
the creditor. Systematically considering the perspective of shareholders and
creditors in both public and closely held corporations will illustrate that
limited liability would be the bargained for rule because it is more
economically sound.
1. Limited Liability as the Default Rule in Public
Corporations
Limited liability of the tort and contract creditors of a public
corporation is the easiest to justify. Both shareholders and creditors would
prefer a structure of limited liability.3 2 It would be easy to conclude that
shareholders would negotiate for a rule of limited liability because out of a
desire to avoid personal liability. But assuming shareholders would choose
limited liability because of a fear of personal liability is overly simplistic.
Rather, control and costs are the driving factors behind shareholders'
preference for limited liability.
If the security of limited liability was the sole reason the
shareholder preferred it, then all business forms would limit the financial
exposure of its members.33 Consider the liability of general partners. It
seems reasonable to assume that if partners could choose, they would select
a rule of limited liability to insulate themselves from the risks of less
prudent partners or reckless employees. But, their ability to directly
participate and control the firm mitigates the risk. Under the Uniformed
Partnership Act (UPA) of 1914, each partner is jointly and severally liable
for the other partners' actions within the scope of the partnership, whether
tort or contract.34 Similarly, the partners are jointly liable for all other
partnership debts.35 The Revised Uniformed Partnership Act (RUPA) is
similar. Under the RUPA, partners are jointly and severally liable for both
30 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 485-86.
31 d. at 486.
32 See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 488-506.
3 Currently, limited liability is not only an aspect of corporations. Many states
have enacted other business forms which also provide limited liability. Every state
except Vermont and Wyoming has limited liability partnership laws. CARL S.
BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLIENBURGER, LTD. LIAB. Co.: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW,
LLCO 15.01 (West 2009). See Rev. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act (2006); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP
ACT (2001).
34 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 15(a) (1914).
3s UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 15(b) (1914).
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kinds of debts. In either case, the partners bear a tremendous burden: the
risk of personal liability beyond the assets invested in the firm for the
actions of fellow partners or agents.37
Shareholders on the other hand want to limit personal exposure
because of the costs involved in unlimited liability.38 In a world of
unlimited liability, shareholders would exercise more direct control over the
corporation's operations. 3 If a shareholder's personal assets could satisfy
corporate debts, the shareholders would demand a more active role in
directing the firm's operations to accompany their risk.40 Shareholder
control comes at a tremendous cost to management. The management of a
company would need to provide information and facilitate active
participation by shareholders.4 1 In the modem public corporation, the
participation of individual shareholders in the management of the company
would be bedlam. Imagine thousands of individuals in a major corporation
attempting to exercise information or control rights. To say such activity
would interfere with efficient centralized management of the corporation
would be an understatement.
In addition to these management costs, shareholders would assume
tremendous monitoring costs if there was joint and several liability.4 2
Shareholders would need to both monitor the management of the firm and
other shareholders' creditworthiness.43 Most shareholders are rationally
apathetic because of a pre-occupation with jobs, family, or other matters.4
36 REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306 (1996), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bllarchives/ulc/fniact99/1990s/upa97fa.pdf.
3 Professor Larry Ribstein has argued the partnership form of organization has
survived "because of regulation and tax law, and not because of the preferences of
individual contracting parties." Robert W. Hamilton & Larry E. Ribstein, Limited
Liability and the Real World, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 693 (1997).
38 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 489-91.
39 Partners, however, have both unlimited liability and the control to protect it.
Each partner "is given an equal voice in decisions that expose him or her to
potentially unlimited personal liability." Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 490.
40 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 500.
41 Harry G. Hutchinson & R. Sean Alley, The High Costs ofShareholder
Participation, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 941, 949 (2009) (noting that "[r]ational
shareholders demand participation in their investments only when the benefits of
doing so (in the broadest sense) are greater than the costs.").
42 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 490.
43 Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis ofLimited Liability in Corporation
Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 136 (1980).
" See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 81 (1932); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
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But the monitoring necessary under unlimited liability would demand much
more time and effort, essentially turning investing itself into a full time job
or severely limiting the number of investments a shareholder could make.45
In either case, with a rule of unlimited liability, the shareholder's ability to
diversify away some risks would be damaged, if not eliminated. However,
under limited liability, shareholders are able to diversify stock portfolios
and refrain from monitoring. If one investment tanks, the shareholder still
has other investments and will only lose a small portion of his or her capital
value.46
On a superficial level, it seems ridiculous to argue contractual or
tort creditors would choose limited liability. Limited liability would
effectively limit the collection of an outstanding debt to corporate assets.
Once those assets are exhausted, the creditors would be stuck without
recourse. 4 7 If nothing else, creditors would want the option of securing
financial obligations using personal assets and capital of shareholders.4 8
But, balancing the advantages of unlimited liability against the cost of
enforcement and the detriment to society indicates that even creditors prefer
that shareholders have limited liability.
First, creditors would have insurmountable procedural problems
with enforcing unlimited liability. Initially, creditors would need to obtain
personal jurisdiction over shareholders who might reside out of state.
However, it seems doubtful that they could do so constitutionally.4 9 Since
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 527 (1990) (noting the view that "[c]ollective
action problems make shareholder passivity inevitable").
45 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 491.
46 Id. The prospect of unlimited liability also creates a free riding problem between
shareholders. Most shareholders would benefit from the monitoring of a few
shareholders but would not need to incur the costs themselves. ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 101 (2d. ed. 1997). They could obtain the
benefit from the collective activity of the other shareholders. Id. However, the
incentives to free ride will be great since most of the gains of monitoring will go to
both monitoring and non-monitoring shareholders. Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1071, 1081-
83 (1992). Since these incentives are high, there may be too much free riding. The
result would be inadequate monitoring and eventually losses from ineffective
supervision. Therefore, because of the costs to the firm in shareholder
management, the costs of monitoring to shareholders, and the risks of rendering
monitoring ineffective because of free riding, shareholders prefer limited liability
over unlimited liability.
47 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 492.
48 id.
49 Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural
Lens, 106 HARv. L. REv. 387, 389-99 (1992). However as an alternative, if a firm
enters bankruptcy national service of process is available since there is nationwide
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International Shoe, a defendant must have minimum contracts with the
jurisdiction.o However, in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court held
ownership of stock shares did not create minimum contacts in the state
where the company was incorporated." It seems implausible that a creditor
could sustain jurisdiction against a shareholder based solely on stock
ownership. This would limit the pool of shareholders and shareholder assets
to a small group of in-state shareholders, none of who may have substantial
assets, individually or collectively.
Assuming creditors could locate sufficient shareholders that a court
would have personal jurisdiction over, the creditors would need to
determine a choice of law question: whether the law of the state of
incorporation governs such a suit.5 2 Any question about the rights or
obligations of shareholders is necessarily a question of state law.53 These
questions are generally answered under the corporate law for the state of
incorporation. 5 4 However, if a state would permit unlimited liability and a
creditor was to sue a shareholder, presumably the state law of the
incorporating state would control. 5 States permitting unlimited liability
would be a serious competitive disadvantage protecting their corporate law
franchise. Few, if any, corporations would incorporate in a jurisdiction
permitting shareholder liability. As a result, any state would be hesitant to
permit unlimited liability on its own.
Even ignoring these procedural issues, creditors will be obliged to
monitor the creditworthiness of all (or at least the wealthiest)
shareholders. Since the shareholders are the ultimate source of funds in an
unlimited liability world, creditors would need assurance that the assets of
jurisdiction. See LYNN LOPuCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS § 3.03[D] (3d ed. 1997).
50 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
51 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
52 Id. Some states might obtain a competitive advantage over other states by
creating a default rule of limited liability, which might render the debate moot.
53 Alexander, supra note 49, at 410.
54 Id. This concept is generally known as the internal affairs doctrine. The internal
affairs doctrine states that in the interest of predictable and uniform application of
the law, the state of incorporation has the closest connection with the issues.
Therefore, the law of the state of incorporation should govern.
55 Id. at 413.
56 Creation of such a state law would also create basic fairness and possibly
constitutional problems. Effectively a state would be exercising its legal power
through legislation over people with a limited relationship with the state, and no
ability to influence policy. Id. at 413.
5 Halpern, supra note 43, at 134.
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shareholders surpass any expected claim.58 Otherwise, the creditor would
run the risk of lending to a corporation with no tangible security in
shareholder capital or assets. Though the right to sue shareholders would
exist, it would be functionally useless if the shareholders had no assets. The
costs associated with monitoring shareholder credit would be expensive,
especially when compared to monitoring the corporation's credit. 9
Creditors of large corporations would be willing to accept limited liability
for shareholders.6 o There are some benefits to permitting liability of
shareholders, but the procedural hurdles and the monitoring costs to
creditors demonstrates limited liability is preferable to creditors. Placing the
two on balance, creditors are unwilling to shoulder the additional burdens
associated with unlimited liability.6'
Finally, from a policy perspective limited liability is inefficient
since it merely shifts costs rather than reducing them.62 If shareholders were
held jointly and severally liability, creditors would presumably target the
largest shareholders with the most assets to satisfy any outstanding debt.
These shareholders would seek contribution from other shareholders
through the justice system. Enforcement costs therefore shift from the
creditors to the largest shareholders and society as a whole. Instead of
creating efficiency, liability would effectively create a chain reaction of
lawsuits where the wealthiest shareholders seek contributions from the
other shareholders. These shareholders then in turn will take other
shareholders into court in a web of suits seeking contribution. The costs to
society to enforce unlimited liability would be prohibitively expensive since
courts would be burdened by a line of shareholders seeking contribution.64
58 Id The cost of monitoring creditworthiness is continuous. While an initial credit
check provides a snapshot of the assets available to satisfy default, it is the
financial position of the shareholders at the time of default that the creditor is most
interested in monitoring. Creditors can only collect from shareholders in the
amount possessed at the time breach of contract occurs. As a result, continual and
persistent monitoring is necessary, which in turn increases costs. These
information costs are shifted back to the owners of the company through a higher
interest rate for credit.
5 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 493.60 id
61 Id.
62 id
63 Id. Joint and several liability also creates a basic fairness problem: the most
wealthy shareholder (regardless of the number of shares possessed) will be targeted
by creditors.
6 In addition, joint and several liability sends ripple effects into secondary markets
significantly influencing the ability to sell stock by decreasing its transferability.
The actual value of the stock would need to include the assets of the stockholders
who owned the shares. As a result, shares would not only reflect the value of cash
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Similar to contract creditors, involuntary tort creditors would likely
prefer limited liability because the alternative makes it more difficult for
creditors to collect against corporations. Limited liability encourages equity
investment in corporations. This means corporations have a pool of capital
available to satisfy all debt obligations. By promoting investment, limited
liability creates a larger pool of capital that tort creditors can draw from if
they are successful.66 Tort creditors want the corporation to have a large
equity cushion. If the corporation would declare bankruptcy, the tort
creditor's claim would be subordinated to the claims of secured creditors
and shared pro rata with other general creditors. Or if there was unlimited
liability, fewer people would invest and fewer equity funds would be
available to satisfy the claim because of the lower position of the tort
creditors. Tort creditors would likely prefer limited liability because the
equity pool is larger and because of the incentive to invest.68
In conclusion, both the contract and the tort creditors of large
corporations should prefer limited liability. Limited liability eliminates
enforcement and monitoring costs and the procedural issues associated with
enforcing a judgment against out of state shareholders. It creates a deeper
flow to the company, but would depend on the owner's ability to pay debts. The
effect would be non-fungible shares. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 493.
65 Even the most staunch critics of limited liability admit that allowing unlimited
liability of shareholders would increase the costs of equity investment. Henry
Hansman & Reinier Kraakmann, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1903 (1991) ("Indeed, the purpose of
unlimited liability is to make share prices reflect tort costs."). While the rational
investor might not care, loss averse investors (which constitute most people) will
overemphasize the rises of an investment under unlimited liability. Bainbridge,
supra note 13, at 498.
66 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 498. While Hansman and Kraakman do point out
unlimited liability would increase the cost of equity investment since share prices
would reflect tort risk, they contend there would not be an exodus from the equity
market. However, behavioral economics shows that often when individuals make
investments, the behavior is often framed in terms of potential losses, not gains. So
the fear of losing a certain sum of money outweighs the pleasures of receiving the
same amount because most people are loss averse. Though this activity is
inherently irrational, investors will tend not to invest in equity markets.67 id.
68 Unlimited liability creates other hurdles for any creditor. The usual
constitutional and procedural hurdles for any creditor also pose problems for
involuntary creditors. In addition, for a shareholder to be personally liable a court
must define when liability attaches: when the claim is filed, when the injury occurs,
or at the time ofjudgment. None of these options is particularly easy to administer
and often incentives dumping stock by startled shareholders. See Bainbridge,
supra note 13, at 497.
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pocket for tort creditors to satisfy their claim. In addition, the shareholders
themselves can avoid the costs of monitoring the corporation's management
and one another. A default rule of limited liability is therefore the most
beneficial for all parties involved. Since limited liability is the most rational
rule of parties, it has becomes the default for contract creditors.
2. Limited Liability as the Default in Closely Held
Corporations
A default rule of limited liability for the closely held corporation is
more difficult to justify. Since the shareholders and managers are the same,
there is a greater possibility of the corporations externalizing risk onto its
creditors. 6 9 There are fewer costs to creditors for collecting a claim and
monitoring corporate constituencies.70 The choice of law and personal
jurisdiction issues are less problematic because the shareholder and
corporation are in the same state.7 ' Finally, unlike public corporations,
many contract creditors require shareholders of a closely held corporation
to personally guarantee the loan by negotiating around the default rule.72
Since many creditors bargain around the rule, it seems counterintuitive to
require parties to incur expenses bargaining around the default rule. But
since the creditor is the cheapest cost avoider, the burden of bargaining is
placed with him or her.
As the cheapest cost avoider, the contract creditor is in the best
position to determine if the added protection of the shareholder's personal
6 9 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 56 (1991). Compare the close corporation to the public
corporation where ownership and control are separate. The diversified
shareholders cannot force the directors or officers to take any action, particularly
actions which risk adverse managers are hesitant to take. Bainbridge, supra note
13, at 501.70 d
7n Id Bringing a claim against a closely held corporation or its shareholders
generally presents few legal procedural issues. Since the corporation and its
limited number of shareholders are nearly one in the same, the shareholders are
almost always found in the same jurisdiction. As a result, the personal jurisdiction
and choice of law issues become moot.
72 Id. In other words, the creditor requires that the shareholder provide his or her
own personal assets as security, negating the rule of limited liability.
7 There is also a problem with defining a closely held corporation which makes the
blanket rule more appealing. See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 501. When there
are a handful of shareholders, unlimited liability makes sense as a default rule, but
it is difficult to determine when there are enough shareholders to negate the need
for limited liability. Randomly selecting a critical mass of shareholders which is
sufficient limited liability is non-sensical and arbitrary.
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assets is necessary to provide security for the loan.74 Limited liability then
serves as a penalty on the creditor. Without contracting around the default
rule of limited liability, creditors might suffer a loss if the firm becomes
insolvent. Their ability to recover damages is limited to corporate assets
that might prove insufficient. But even if creditors are the cheapest cost
avoider, making them bear the transactional costs to bargain around the
default rule of limited liability seems unfair. After all, if the majority of
them would choose unlimited liability, the most efficient rule would
eliminate transaction costs incurred by the creditor contracting around the
debt. In this situation, limited liability acts as a penalty default. But
imposing the penalty on creditors is the most efficient outcome, despite the
transactional costs. Limited liability forces creditors to bargain because the
costs to the judicial process are greater than the costs of forcing creditors to
bargain. The overall costs of creating a penalty default are less than creating
a rule of unlimited liability and forcing courts to determine ex post what the
parties actually intended. 7 Since it is less costly to force the cheapest cost
avoider creditor to bargain out of limited liability, it remains the default
rule.
Limited liability for the tort creditors of shareholders of closely
held corporations is the most difficult to justify which is why many
commentators have proposed abolishing it.79 Shareholders are actively
involved in the business and would have low monitoring costs over
74 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970) (discussing "cheaper
cost avoider" concept in tort context); cf COOTER & ULEN, supra note 46, at 242
(discussing concept of "lowest-cost risk-bearer" in contract context).
7 Forcing creditors to bear the costs to contract around the default rule seems
unfair. Penalty defaults "are most appropriate where it is more costly for courts to
determine what the parties would have wanted than for the parties to bargain ex
ante." Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 502.
76 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 46, at 242.
7 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
78 The exception to this explanation is where the shareholder misrepresents the
assets of the corporation to the creditor. When a shareholder misrepresents, the
creditor does not know of the need to bargain for a personal assurance from the
shareholder. However, misrepresentation is one of the classic justifications for veil
piercing. See Perpetual Real Est Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d
500, 545 (4th Cir. 1992). Under the MBCA, if a controlling shareholder misleads
the creditor there may be no need to make a veil piercing claim. I MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT. ANN. § 6.22(b) (3d ed. Supp. 1997) (a shareholder "may become
personally liable by reason of this own acts or conduct.").
Hansmann & Kraakmann, supra note 65, at 1916-23; see also David W.
Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565,
1613-23 (1991).
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management - since they are effectively the management. The shareholder
is also often the cheapest cost avoider and could exercise control to assure
adequate insurance or monitoring employees. The creditor also will incur
few enforcement costs against a limited number of shareholders.
However, limited liability remains the default rule because it is
socially undesirable for the shareholders in a close corporation to
internalize all the risks created by the firm.80 Shareholders of close
corporations do not escape under limited liability.8 ' If a tort claim is
brought, the shareholder stands the possibility of losing his or her job if the
company folds in addition to whatever personal assets the shareholder
invested in the corporation.8 2 But more importantly, tort creditors free ride
on the monitoring from contract creditors. Contract creditors usually
require the corporation to have a pool of unencumbered assets. 4 Tort
creditors therefore receive the benefit of contract creditors' monitoring,
assuring there is at least some pool of assets for the creditor to draw upon.s
As a result, social policy does not require shareholders to internalize tort
risk by creating a default rule of unlimited liability.
A. The Exception to Limited Liability: Piercing the Veil
On an abstract level, veil piercing should coincide with the weakest
justifications for limited liability. Ideally, these are the places where there is
the greatest risk of the corporation externalizing risk and the lowest costs of
enforcement. In practice, the court should ask whether the shareholder
should be forced to internalize the risks that he or she has externalized by
balancing the need to compensate victims, capital formation, and the
80 There is also the same line drawing problem that plagues contract creditors of
close corporations.
81 It is also important to note the small number of creditors in the involuntary tort
category. It is fair to assume most corporations do not engage in excessive
amounts of tort risk. As economist Michael Dooley has pointed out, corporations,
"unless we are nearing Doomsday - produce goods and services that are entirely
benign from a health standpoint and restrict their 'risk taking' to the financial
variety." MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 56 (1995).
The radical proposal of dispensing with limited liability makes even less sense
when it is pointed out how few people are affected. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at
500 n.101.
82 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 504.
83 Id.
94Id.
85 Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that despite the attractiveness of
unlimited liability for shareholders when there is a tort, such claims are rarely
successful. Instead, the most successful veil piercing claims are predominantly by
contract creditors. Thompson, supra note 2, at 1058 (registering a success rate of
thirty-one percent for tort creditors).
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development and growth of the economy. But many commentators have
pointed out the uncertainty of piercing cases. Veil piercing has a number
of cases which are outliers and do not conform to the theory of veil
piercing. Some of these decisions are explainable as the result of the
remedy's equitable nature and the number of factors that courts have
indicated are relevant. Some improper applications are expected. Veil
piercing is highly contextual - and sometimes downright unpredictable -
but looking at cases, a main body of decisions illustrates the situation where
- 89
veil piercing is nearly a guarantee.
The contractarian theory of limited liability indicates there are
some instances when a corporation's veil should be pierced, primarily when
there is a closely held corporation and there is misrepresentation or fraud. 90
In a closely held corporation, the shareholders are the managers, unlike the
public corporation where there is a separation of control and ownership.9'
Thus in close corporation, there are greater incentives to externalize risk
because the managers will directly benefit from the gains of risky behavior
as shareholders.9 2 Similarly, fraud or misrepresentation by the shareholder
deceives the creditor into believing no personal assurance is needed and
therefore no bargaining around the default rule. In other words, the creditor
does not know that he or she needs protection from the default standard.
Therefore, piercing a corporation's veil is consistent with limited liability
86 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 506.
87 See supra notes 6-8.
88 Courts have indicated that the following factors are relevant to veil piercing
cases: undercapitalization; misrepresentation; failure to follow corporate
formalities; overlap of corporate records; functions or personnel; misrepresentation;
shareholder domination; intertwining and lack of substantive separation; use of the
terms 'alter ego' and 'instrumentality'; fairness; assumption of risk; refusal to let a
corporation pierce itself; statutory policy. Thompson, supra note 2, at 1044.
89 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1038-39. The rationale for piercing is more effective
in contract claims than torts, leading to more success for tort claims. Most
formalities of the rule demonstrate that the two prongs must be met for a
corporation's veil to be pierced: control and fraud or injustice. The second element
is easier to prove for contract creditors where there is often concrete evidence of
fraud or misrepresentation.
90 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 503 n.l 14.
91 Id. at 501.
92 Sometimes the very purpose of incorporation can be to externalize risk. For
example, in Walkovsky, the shareholder could have chosen to organize his taxi
company as a sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation. However, he chose
to incorporate each individual taxi cab in order to avoid personal liability.
Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 6-7 (N.Y. 1966)
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theory when a closely held corporation's shareholders engage in
misrepresentation or fraud deceiving creditors.93
Most courts have indicated that numerous factors are relevant when
deciding to disregard the corporate entity, including: undercapitalization;
misrepresentation; failure to follow corporate formalities; overlap of
corporate records; functions or personnel; shareholder domination;
intertwining and lack of substantive separation; conclusory use of the terms
'alter ego' and 'instrumentality'; fairness; assumption of risk; refusal to let
a corporation pierce itself; and statutory policy.94 In a typical formulation,
these factors are grouped into a two pronged 'instrumentality' test requiring
first, domination or control of the corporation and second, some sort of
fraud or injustice which violates the creditor's rights.95 In practice, these
two steps cover most of the situations where the justifications for limited
liability are weakest.
First, courts typically find control of a corporation when there is a
shareholder who dominates the corporation to the extent that the person and
the corporation are one in the same.96 There are no corporate ends beyond
the controlling shareholder's goals. The corporation is a facade or dummy
for an individual acting in his or her own benefit. Often this is exemplified
by co-mingling corporate and personal assets or the failure to observe
corporate formalities.97 Requiring control or domination is consistent with
the underpinning of limited liability.98 The control requirement excludes
large public corporations. Limited liability for public corporations with
many shareholders encourages the transferability of stock and
diversification as well as negates the need for expending monitoring costs.99
However, when there is a close corporation, these concerns are less
prominent. Managers of close corporations with few shareholders have the
9 In comparison, perhaps the thinnest rationalization for limited liability is the tort
creditor because of the inability of creditors to bargain around the rule. Bainbridge,
supra note 13, at 505 (citing Thompson, supra note 2, at 1058). However, tort
creditors have more difficulty in piercing the corporate veil. Tort creditors are only
successful about a third of the time. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 505.
94 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1044.
9 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 507-08. Some courts have sanctioned an agency
view of the corporation and its shareholders by permitting veil piercing when there
is only control of the corporation. See Walkovsky, 223 N.E.2d at 6.
96 This first part of the test is analogous to the alter ego step of the Belvedere veil
piercing test in Ohio. See Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n. v. R.E.
Roark Cos., Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1086 (Ohio 1993).
9 See Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir.
1991) (court noting co-mingling or corporate assets by the single shareholder of a
corporation and failure to observe formalities indicated that the shareholder-
defendant dominated the corporation).
98 Sometimes undercapitalization is considered a factor in demonstrating control.
See McCallum Family LLC v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 74 (Colo. App. 2009).
9 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 501.
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greatest incentives to engage in risky behavior.'" When a closely held
corporation is dominated by a single shareholder, the most significant
limited liability concerns are triggered because shareholders have the
greatest incentives to externalize risk.'o' This theory is supported by
empirical evidence: public corporations are never pierced.102 In Professor
Richard Thompson's survey of two thousand veil piercing cases, not a
single public corporation's veil was pierced. 0 3 Thompson's research
indicates that when a court points out a lack of separation between the
individual and corporation, intertwining, or use of the term "dummy," the
court pierces the veil in over eighty-five percent of cases.A When the court
notes the absence of domination or control, the veil is not pierced in over
ninety-eight percent of cases.'os As a result, the domination and control of a
corporation is a prerequisite to piercing the veil.
The second part of the veil piercing test requires fraudulent activity
or injustice that would be perpetrated by allowing a shareholder to enjoy
limited liability.'0 The dominant view is that control of the corporation
alone is not enough to pierce the corporate veil. 07 The existence of injustice
is a loose standard, but most courts agree that merely the existence of an
outstanding claim is not enough to satisfy this requirement. 08 Otherwise,
any and all claims would pierce the corporate veil if successful on the
10' Id
102 Empirical evidence demonstrates few, if any, publicly held corporations can be
pierced. Thompson, supra note 2, at 1070.
Id .
10 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1063. When the term dummy is used, the rate of
piercing increases to nearly ninety percent.
o5 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1064 n. 141. Thompson notes that when the court
notes domination of the corporation, the rate of pierce is less than sixty percent.
When those factors are absent, it is almost universally fatal to the claim.
Highlighting the absence of a single element leading to no piercing provides a more
significant insight into the importance of that factor since it is singled out rather
then mentioned in laundry list fashion.
106 See, e.g., Van Dom Co. v. Future Chemical & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 570 (7th
Cir. 1985); Collet v. Am. Nat'l Stores, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 273, 284 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986).
107 Satisfying the first prong alone is almost universally considered insufficient to
pierce the veil. See Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 260 P.2d 269, 277 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1953). But see Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 6 (N.Y. 1966)
(indicating that domination and control of a corporation is enough to establish the
corporation is the shareholder's alter ego and therefore pierce the corporate veil).
108 Assoc. Venders, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 816 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962) (holding that it "is not sufficient to merely show that a creditor will
remain unsatisfied if the corporate veil is not pierced.").
332 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW Vol. 5:1
JOURNAL
merits.109 Most states require some form of active and intentional
misconduct, not mere unfairness. The lack of guidance from the courts
make ex/ante business organization planning difficult. Instead, courts often
produce a list of factors influencing the decision to pierce the veil."o Some
courts have indicated no less than twenty separate determinants influence
veil piercing."' The most common criteria are fraud and
misrepresentation.112
Fraud can include a variety of deceptive acts including anything
from a fraudulent conveyance to forging documents to demonstrate the
financial health of the firm.'"3 Misrepresentation is a lower hurdle and can
include misrepresenting corporate assets or the party responsible for
payment.114 Misrepresentation and fraud are the most important from a
limited liability standpoint. Deceiving creditors about the corporation's
capital formation hides critical facts from the cheapest cost avoider and
prevents him or her from bargaining for personal security on the loan." 5 In
other words, it allows the shareholder externalize the risk by shifting it to
the creditor without the creditor's knowledge. The application of
misrepresentation indicates that misrepresentation is considered a
significant consideration in cases where the corporate veil is pierced." 6 The
factor is cited most by courts and when it exists, the veil is pierced in over
ninety-four percent of cases." 7 When the court notes the factor is absent, it
goes on to pierce in only seven percent of cases." 8
In sum, contractarian theory of limited liability indicates that
attempts to pierce the veil should be most successful when there is a closely
held firm and there is some misrepresentation or fraud involved. Despite the
patchwork of case law about veil piercing, the majority of courts are
109 Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 544-45 (Ohio 2008).
110 In Winger, the court noted that many factors were relevant when considering a
veil claim, including: "whether (1) the corporation is operated as a distinct business
entity; (2) funds and assets are commingled; (3) adequate corporate records are
maintained; (4) the nature and form of the entity's ownership and control facilitate
misuse by an insider; (5) the business is thinly capitalized; (6) the corporation is
used as a "mere shell"; (7) legal formalities are disregarded; and (8) corporate
funds or assets are used for noncorporate purposes." McCallum Family LLC v.
Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 74 (Colo. App. 2009).
"' Assoc. Venders, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. at 813-15.
112 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1038.
" See Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp., 763 F. Supp 1445, 1451-52
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (for a discussion of facts in a veil piercing case leading to a finding
of fraud).
114 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1044 n.53.
"s Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 503.
116 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1066.
.. Id. at 1063.
"' Id. at 1065 n.142.
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consistent: if a closely held firm is dominated by a single shareholder" 9
who actively engages in fraud or misrepresentation of corporate assets or
finances, the likelihood of piercing the corporation's veil is nearly a
certainty. Despite commentary to the contrary, there is a solid core of
activity that directly leads to veil piercing.' 20
III. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN OHIO: FROM STANDARD OIL TO
DOMBROSKI
Like most states, Ohio has created an equitable remedy for misuse
of the corporate form through corporate veil piercing.121 In 1892, the Ohio
Supreme Court first recognized the equitable remedy against the
shareholders of a corporation in State ex rel. Attorney General v. Standard
Oil. 122 In Standard Oil, the court noted that the corporate form was a fiction
that bestowed on a group of individuals a legal identity. However, the
corporate form may be disregarded when it is used "to an intent and
purpose not within its reason and policy."1 23
The Standard Oil court reasoned that individuals could be acting
either through their own legal identity or through the corporation.124 It was
the court's role to decide whether to attribute individual actions to the
individual's legal identity or the corporation.125 As a fiction of the law, the
corporation cannot defeat the purpose for which it was invented.126 Since a
corporation could only be organized for a lawful purpose, actions by
individuals that were unlawful could not be attributed to the corporation.12 7
Any illegal actions were therefore the conduct of the shareholder and not
the corporation. The alternative would permit shareholders to insulate
themselves in the corporate form and provide practical personal immunity
"1 Domination is shown by failing to observe formalities, mingling business and
personal assets, failing to keep business records and thin capitalization. McCallum
Family LLC v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 74 (Colo. App. 2009).
120 That there is predictable activity leading to piercing is not to say there are never
unpredictable decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Toler, 666 F. Supp. 2d 872, 886
(S.D. Ohio 2009) (noting incorrectly that control of the corporation was sufficient
to pierce the corporate veil negating the need for Belvedere's second prong under
Ohio law).
121 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E.2d 279, 287 (Ohio
1892).122 id.
123 Id. at 287.
I24 id.
125 Id.
126 ida
127 Id. at 179.
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for a host of offenses.128 The Standard Oil court's analysis focused more on
the concept of disregarding the corporate entity as opposed to piercing the
corporate veil. The court recognized that it was the shareholder acting
individually, not the corporation. Accordingly, it held the individual
personally responsible, not the corporation.' 29
The Standard Oil court's articulated policy was not a practical test,
ready for application in complex situations.' 0A few years later, in First
National Bank of Chicago v. F.C. Trebein Co., the Ohio Supreme Court
held the two circumstances under which the corporate form would be
disregarded: fraud and illegal activity.131 Then in North v. Higabee, the
Supreme Court flatly rejected the idea that unity of ownership was enough
to pierce the corporate veil.132 Instead the North court created a two-step
test, requiring the party seeking to disregard the corporate entity to
demonstrate first that "the corporation was formed to perpetrate a fraud and
[second] the shareholder's control of the corporation was exercised to
defraud the party." 3 3 The requirement that the corporation be formed to
commit fraud was a high barrier to piercing any corporation's veil - even if
that corporation had engaged in extensive illegal conduct. 134
128 Id. at 287-88.
129 The court's reasoning provided security for the corporate form. Theoretically,
nothing could pierce the corporate veil since the corporation was organized for
lawful purposes. Therefore, any unlawful activity of the corporation must be
attributed to the individual, not the corporation. However practically, the court's
disregard of the corporate form while providing the ultimate theoretical security,
had the same effect as permitting the party to pierce the corporate veil.
130 In Standard Oil, the court's syllabus held: "That a corporation is a legal entity,
apart from natural person who compose it, is mere fiction ... but like every other
fiction of law, when urged to an intent and purpose not within its reason and policy,
may be disregarded." Id. at 285. In Ohio, the syllabus has the weight of law. See
Akers v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 508 N.E.2d 964, 964 n.1 (Ohio 1987).
13' First Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. F.C. Trebein Co., 52 N.E.2d 834, 835 (Ohio 1898)
(holding "A corporation cannot be formed for the purpose of accomplishing a fraud
or other illegal act under the disguise of the fiction; and, when this is made to
appear, the fiction will be disregarded by the courts."). However in Trebein, the
court failed to directly mention one of the primary modem requirements of most
veil-piercing tests: unity of interest and ownership. See Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991). But, its application notes that
the corporation is usually owned almost entirely by one individual. Trebein, 52
N.E.2d at 838.
132 North v. Higbee, 3 N.E.2d 391, 395 (Ohio 1936).
133 Id. at 391.
114 Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 (noting "it seems that in practice it would be
unreasonably difficult to prove that any corporate on was actuallyformed in order
to perpetrate a fraud."). Under the North rule, even the most egregious acts could
insulate the individual if the corporation was formed for a legitimate purpose. The
ease of forming corporations under state law and the ability to transfer ownership
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Finally, in 1993, the Ohio Supreme Court created the modem test in
Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Association. v. R.E. Roark Cos.,
Inc.'35 The court held there was a three pronged inquiry: (1) whether the
corporation was the alter ego of the individual which would render the
individual and corporation fundamentally indistinguishable, (2) whether
control was exercised to commit fraud or an illegal act and (3) an injury or
loss resulted to the plaintiff from such control and wrong.13 6
A. Pre-Dombroski: The Diference of Opinion
Prior to Dombroski in 2007, Ohio appellate courts had set up two
distinct camps interpreting Belvedere.137 The majority of courts recognized
that Belvedere's second prong, requiring "fraud or illegal activity," was not
explicitly limited to those circumstances.13 8 Other considerations such as
"harm, injustice, or fundamental unfairness" could satisfy the second
Belvedere element.13 9 The Third, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth
District Courts of Appeals adopted the more expansive view.'40 Even the
federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the more liberal
meant a corporation could be formed for a perfectly legitimate and legal purpose
only to later be an instrument of fraud. North, 3 N.E.2d at 391.
13' Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1075.
136 Id. at 289.
1 See Wiencek v. Atcole Company, Inc., 671 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (Ohio App. 3d
Dist. 1996). But see Collum v. Perlman, No. L-98-1291, 1999 WL 252725, at *3
(Ohio App. 6th Dist. Apr. 30, 1999).
13 id.
139 Wiencek, 671 N.E.2d at 1342.
140 26-11 FLETCHER CORP. LAw ADVISOR art. VII (2008). See, e.g., Robert A.
Saurber Gen. Contr., Inc. v. McAndrews, CA2003-09-239, 2004 WL 2937627, at
*5 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. Dec. 20, 2004); State v. Tri-State Group, Inc., No.
03BE61, 2004 WL 1882567, at *14 (Ohio App. 7th Dist. Aug. 20, 2004);
Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gasbarro, No. 01AP-461, 2004 WL 583849, at *8 (Ohio
App. 10th Dist. Mar. 25, 2004); Stypula v. Chandler, No. 2002-G-2468, 2003 WL
22844296, at *3 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. Nov. 26, 2003); Dalicandro v. Morrison
Road Dev. Co., Inc., No. OOAP-619, 2001 WL 379893, at *7 (Ohio App. 10th Dist.
Apr. 17, 2001); Pritchett, Dlusky & Saxe v. Pingue, 96APE 1-1598, 1997 WL
578952 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. Sept. 16, 1997); Wiencek, 671 N.E.2d at 1342
("Based upon a reading of Belvedere, the purpose of the 'piercing the corporate
veil' theory, and Ohio case law prior to and subsequent to Belvedere, we hold that
one seeking to disregard the corporate entity may present evidence that the
shareholder exercised his control over the corporation in such a manner as to
commit a fraud, illegal, or other unjust or inequitable act upon the person seeking
to disregard the corporate entity in order to satisfy the second prong of the test
enunciated in Belvedere."),
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interpretation.14' However, the Sixth District Court of Appeals in Collum v.
Perlman concluded that 'fraud or illegal act' was literally limited to fraud
or illegal conduct.14 2 Absence of one of the factors was fatal to any veil
piercing claim, regardless of the equity or fairness.14 3
In fact, because of the ambiguous foundation of Belvedere's second
prong both positions were well reasoned. The courts favoring a liberal
interpretation noted that prior to Belvedere, the Ohio Supreme Court had
seemed to indicate that "the perpetuation of a fraud or illegality is not the
sole ground for disregarding the corporate entity."'" In Auglaize Box Board
Co. v. Hinton, the Ohio Supreme Court held in addition to fraud or
illegality, the corporate form "should be disregarded only when justice
cannot be served in any other way." 4 5 Similarly in Thrift Fed. S.&L. Assn.
v. Overton, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the corporate entity could be
disregarded since the "individualities of the [person] and this corporation
are nonexistent."'" The ambiguity of the court's language in Overton,
resulted in two possible interpretations: either only unity of ownership was
necessary for the corporation's veil to be pierce or the corporate veil could
be pierced in situations where fraud and illegality were not present.'4 7 The
appellate courts picked up on this language and expanded the equitable
doctrine to situations beyond fraud or other illegality.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Belvedere did nothing to
clear the rapidly muddying waters. While the decision laid out a practical
three-pronged test for corporate veil piercing, it did not address the
mounting confusion in the lower courts. In fact, the court complicated the
situation by adopting a test that was not exclusively limited to fraud or
illegal acts. In Belvedere, the corporate veil piercing test Ohio adopted was
taken from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. General
Products Corp.148 The second prong of the Sixth Circuit's veil piercing test
included both fraud and illegality, but also included "other dishonest or
unjust acts . . . ."149 The Belvedere court quoted Bucyrus favorably
141 Taylor Steel, Inc. v. Keeton, 417 F.3d 598, 609 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting "Ohio
courts have recognized that although the Belvedere court used 'fraud' and 'criminal
activity' in defining the second prong, the true question to be asked is whether it
would be unjust under the circumstances of each case .....
142 Collum, 1999 WL 252725, at *3.
143 d
4 LeRoux's Billyle Supper Club v. Ma, 602 N.E.2d 685, 688 (Ohio App. 6th Dist.
1991) (citing E.S. Preston Assoc., Inc. v. Preston, 92 N.E.2d 441, 446 (Ohio
1986)).
145 E.S. Preston Assoc., 92 N.E.2d at 446.
146 Thrift Fed. S.&L. Ass'n v. Overton, 563 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Ohio 1990).
147id
148 Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n. v. R.E. Roark Cos., Inc., 617
N.E.2d 1075, 1086 (Ohio 1993).
149 Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Gen. Products Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 1981).
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indicating that the holding "strikes the correct balance between the principle
of limited shareholder liability and the reality that the corporate fiction is
sometimes used by shareholders to protect themselves from liability for
their own misdeeds."o50 However, when the Ohio Supreme Court restated
its own test in Belvedere, it cut the language from Bucyrus that included
inequitable or unfair actions, other than fraud or illegality."s'
The Ohio Supreme Court's removal of 'other dishonest or unjust
acts' in a test that otherwise reproduces the Sixth Circuit's holding is a
glaring - and seemingly intentional - omission. 152 However, the earlier
reliance on an expansive reading of veil piercing likely made the district
appellate court judges hesitant to overrule their own clear precedent without
an affirmative indication from the Ohio Supreme Court. Since the divergent
views in the districts already existed prior to Belvedere and the Ohio
Supreme Court did not take any steps in Belvedere to clarify, the district
courts held to their precedent allowing unjust or inequitable acts to pierce
the corporate veil. 153 The lower courts in Ohio were faced with a decision:
conclude that the omission of unjust act from Belvedere was an oversight
(since the Ohio Supreme Court favorably cited a case which included it) or
conclude the omission was purposeful despite no indication the court was
overruling other precedent. In Dombroski v. WellPoint Inc., the Ohio
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the confusion of whether the second
"s Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086.
'5 Id. (holding "control over the corporation by those to be held liable was
exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person
seeking to disregard the corporate entity .... .").
152 Compare Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d 1075 at 1086 (holding the corporate entity may
be disregarded when "(1) control over the corporation by those to be held liable
was so complete that the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its
own, (2) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was exercised in
such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to
disregard the corporate entity, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff
from such control and wrong.") with Bucyrus, 643 F.3d at 418 (holding the
corporate entity may be disregarded when "(1) domination and control over the
corporation by those to be held liable is so complete that the corporation has no
separate mind, will, or existence of its own; (2) that domination and control was
used to commit fraud or wrong or other dishonest or unjust act, and (3) injury or
unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff from such control and wrong.").
15 Furthermore, the federal courts persist in holding that the first step of the
Belvedere test is itself a basis for disregarding limited liability. See In re Fisher,
No. 07-3319, 2008 WL 4569946, at *5 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2008); Toler, 666 F.
Supp. 2d at 886. In other words, there is an erroneous belief that control and
domination alone are sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. Dombroski v.
Wellpoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 545 (Ohio 2008) ("The first and third prongs of
the Belvedere . .. must still be met for a piercing claim to succeed.").
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Belvedere prong could allow conduct less than fraud or illegality to pierce
the veil.15 4
B. Fraud or Inequity: Is there any Diference?
The difference between allowing mere inequity or unfairness to satisfy
the requirement for veil piercing and requiring fraud or illegal conduct is a
broad one, at least theoretically. The fraud or illegality requirement erected
by the Sixth District in Collum posed a much stricter barrier to parties
attempting to pierce the corporate veil. For example in Collum, financial
problems forced the defendant Perlman to close his corporate enterprise,
Wholesale Lighting.' After liquidating the company's assets, Perlman
paid off sales taxes in Michigan and Ohio in addition to payroll taxes." 6
Left outstanding was nearly $50,000 in unpaid debts, including over $9,000
to Collum.' 57 The Sixth District concluded that there was no fraud or illegal
action taken by Perlman - only an inability to pay outstanding debts.' 58 As
a result, the second prong of Belvedere was not satisfied and the court
reversed the trial court's award to Collum.'59 Similarly in Widlar v. Young,
the Sixth District held that a mere breach of contract could not amount to
fraud or illegal conduct which would justify piercing the corporate veil.160
In contrast, the majority of districts permitted a wide range of
activities to justify the second prong of Belvedere when it was interpreted to
include inequity or unfairness.' 6' In Stypula v. Chandler, the Eleventh
154 Dombroski, 895 N.W.2d at 539.
1 Collum v. Perlman, No. L-98-1291, 1999 WL 252725, at *2 (Ohio App. 6th
Dist. Apr. 30, 1999).
156 id
157 id.
158 Id. at *3.
159 Id. at *4.
160 Widlar v. Young, No. L-05-1184, 2006 WL 456724, at *6 (Ohio App. 6th Dist.
Feb. 24, 2006).
161 While these courts permitted a broad reading of Belvedere, in reality, the liberal
reading was often unnecessary. In Young and Stypula, the existence of fraud by the
defendants was plain. The courts held that the defendants committed fraud or the
facts made fraud fairly apparent. Young, 2006 WL 456724, at *6; Stypula v.
Chandler, No. 2002-G-2468, 2003 WL 22844296, at *3 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. Nov.
26, 2003). In Stypula, the defendant transferred assets from one corporation to
another, with the specific intent to avoid paying a creditor. Stypula, 2003 WL
22844296, at *3. In Young, the court held that the defendant committed fraud.
Young, 2006 WL 456724, at *6. Also in Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gasbarro, the
defendant asset transfers were fraudulent since the defendant had constructive
intent to defraud creditors and the transfers left the corporation totally insolvent.
Sanderson Farms, Inc., 2004 WL 583849, at *12. However, in each of these cases,
the appellate court concluded inequitable circumstances could justify piercing the
corporate veil.
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District permitted a plaintiff to pierce the corporation's veil because the
defendant closed the corporation after a judgment was entered against the
corporation.16 2 Then the defendant created a new corporation, rehired all the
same employees and operated the same business with the same clients out
of the same office three days later.163 The court concluded that permitting
the corporate form to shield the defendant in such a situation was
inequitable and allowed the plaintiff to pierce the corporation's veil.'1'
Similarly, in Wiencek v. Atcole Co., the Third District permitted the
plaintiff to pierce the defendant's corporate veil since the shareholders gave
themselves large bonuses as officers of the corporation and used corporate
assets for personal purchases.16 5 The court concluded these actions may
have depleted profits to an extent that prevented payment to a creditor. 166
The Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District agreed with the Weincek
court's reasoning to permit unjust circumstances to suffice for piercing the
corporate veil. 67
162 Stypula, 2003 WL 22844296, at *3.
164 The court's expansive reading for the second Belvedere prong was entirely
unnecessary in this context. Instead, what the defendant did was plainly a
fraudulent transfer which fulfilled the second prong of Belvedere even under its
literal reading. The defendant fraudulently transferred assets since the transfer
occurred after the debt was incurred and was done with the intent to defraud. Id.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1336.04(A) (West 2009) (Ohio's Fraudulent Transfer
Act); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1336.04(B) (factors to consider in finding a
fraudulent transfer).
16 Wiencek, 671 N.E.2d at 1343 (noting that the defendants "gave themselves very
large bonuses as officers of the corporation, used Atcole to pay for [both] labor (by
an Atcole employee) and material that the [defendant]'s personal residence, and
purchased a recreational vehicle in the corporate name which was used by the
[defendants], but not for corporate purposes.").
'6 Id. at 1343.
167 Robert A. Saurber Gen. Contr., Inc. v. McAndrews, CA2003-09-239, 2004 WL
2937627, at *5 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. Dec. 20, 2004). However, the court's
expansive reading of the second prong of Belvedere was unnecessary since the
court also noted that the defendant defrauded the plaintiff by submitting affidavits
claiming reimbursements for claims which other suppliers held. When the
defendant received a joint check for the amount, he cashed the checks without the
signatures of the other suppliers and failed to reimburse them. The court noted the
existence of fraud, but expanded Belvedere's second element anyway. Id. at 5-6.
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C. Dombroski: Potato or Potahto, Illegal or Unlawful 68
Dombroski was the Ohio Supreme Court's opportunity to set the record
straight on veil piercing in Ohio. The facts of Dombroski were straight-
forward. The plaintiff was Kimberly Dombroski, who was insured by
Community Insurance Company (CIC).169 In 2000, Dombroski received a
cochlear implant in her left ear.7 o By 2005, her doctor determined that a
similar implant was necessary for her right ear. 71 However, CIC denied
coverage for the procedure by concluding that the implant was
investigational.172 Dombroski appealed the decision through the company's
internal process, but was unsuccessful.'73
Dombroski filed suit against CIC in 2006 alleging insurer bad faith,
breach of insurance contract, and promissory estoppel.17 4 The case
originated in the Seventh District, which had accepted the expansive
reading of the second prong of Belvedere that included unjust or inequitable
acts. 75 Dombroski also named WellPoint, Inc. as a defendant in the suit
since CIC was a subsidiary of WellPoint.'7 6 WellPoint was not a party to
the insurance contract.'77 However, Dombroski claimed that WellPoint was
liable for the actions of its subsidiary since she could pierce CIC's
corporate veil. 78 The complaint alleged that CIC was wholly controlled by
WellPoint.179 CIC'S stock was entirely controlled by WellPoint, WellPoint
and CIC had the same officers and directors, and WellPoint controlled CIC
to such a degree that CIC had no independent existence. 80 Dombroski also
claimed that this subsidiary-parent relationship existed "to violate the duty
of good faith and fair dealings to its Ohio insureds, specifically
Dombroski."' 8 ' The trial court concluded Dombroski failed to state a claim
and dismissed the complaint.18 2
168 Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 545-46 (Ohio 2008) (Pfeifer, J.,
dissenting).69 Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 228.
'n' Id17 i .
n7 id.
173 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 541.
174 Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 228.
'7 State v. Tri-State Group, Inc., No. 03BE61, 2004 WL 1882567, at *14 (Ohio
A p. 7th Dist. Aug. 20, 2004).
1FId.
'
77 Id. at 229.
178id
1 Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 228.
'
80 id
1' Id. at 228.
182 Id. at 229.
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On appeal to the Seventh District, the court reversed the decision of
the trial court by holding Dombroski had stated a claim to relief against
WellPoint through corporate veil piercing. 83 The court noted the
substantial precedent interpreting the second prong of Belvedere to include
unjust or inequitable acts.184 The trial court had interpreted Dombroski's
claim as a simple breach of contract that did not rise to the level of unjust or
inequitable acts. 18 However, the Seventh District noted that in the
insurance context, even a simple breach of contract claim involved a
question of the duty of good faith.'8 6 In Ohio, the relationship between the
insurer and insured requires the insurer to "act in good faith in the handling
and payment of the claims of its insured." 87 The court concluded that any
breach of the insurer's duty of good faith is an unjust or inequitable act that
may form the basis of a claim of corporate veil piercing. '88 The second
prong of Belvedere was therefore apparent on the pleadings and the trial
court had dismissed the complaint in error. 89 The court of appeals
determined that its decision was in direct conflict with the judgment of the
Sixth District Court of Appeals and certified the case as a conflict to the
Ohio Supreme Court. 190 The Ohio Supreme Court took the case to resolve
the split in Ohio's districts.' 9'
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the broad reading of Belvedere's
second prong and held that parties seeking to pierce the corporate veil must
allege the literal language of Belvedere: fraud or illegal act.192 The court
reasoned that piercing the corporate veil is a "rare exception to be applied
only in the case of fraud or certain other exceptional circumstances.
While a shareholder is never totally immune for the actions of their
corporation, only criminal conduct or fraud to the detriment of a third party
gives rise to liability.' 94 This ensures that the corporation and the individual
3 Id. at 231.
18 Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 231.
185 id.
186 Id. at 232 (citing Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1315 (Ohio
1983)).87 Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 232.
' Id. at 233.
s89 Id.
190 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 541-42.
191 Dombroski came before the Ohio Supreme Court through a certified conflict
under Section 3(b)(4), Art. IV, Ohio Constitution and Ohio Appellate Rule 25. See
OHIO CONST. ART. IV, § 3(B)(4); OHIO APP. R. 25 (West 2009).
19 2 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 544.
'9 Id. at 542-43 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003)
(internal quotations removed).
194 d.
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remain separate entities and prevents corporate veil piercing every time a
closely held corporation is sued.'9 5 The court noted the literal language of
Belvedere's second prong ensured the correct balance between limited
shareholder liability and misuse of the corporate form.19 6 As a result, the
court concluded that unjust or inequitable conduct "is simply too broad to
survive exacting review" and severed Belvedere's reliance on Bucyrus.19 7
The court could have stopped writing and completed its review by
clearly explaining the limits of corporate veil piercing. However, the court
observed that Belvedere rule was too limited to "protect other potential
parties from the wide variety of egregious shareholder misdeeds that may
occur."'9 8 Under the literal language of Belvedere, shareholders could
misuse the corporate form and evade liability when the shareholders "abuse
the corporate form to commit acts that are as objectiondble as fraud or
illegality."'99 To pierce the corporate veil, the court concluded plaintiffs
must demonstrate fraud, illegality, or a "similarly unlawful act," but
cautioned courts to avoid applying the new test expansively.2 00
The court's new rule has created problems. Currently, the outer
boundaries of the new doctrine of veil piercing are unknown. The Ohio
Supreme Court, in deciding between Belvedere options A or B, created a
third choice, C, which was neither derived from case law nor explained by
the court. The Ohio Supreme Court's only guidance for practitioners and
entrepreneurs interpreting its decision was that its new rule was somewhere
between the liberal 'unfairness or inequity' rule and 'fraud or illegality.'
But where on the spectrum did it fall? Closer to inequity or illegality? The
court seemed to suggest the latter, but the vagueness of the opinion leaves
the question up in the air.
Justice Pfeifer's dissent attacks the majority on this issue - pointing
out that the additional language "[i]nstead of resolving the conflict . . . has
muddied the waters."201 Pfeifer notes: "[t]he new language seems to be
'95 Id. at 544-45 (noting if the court "[w]ere [] to allow piercing every time a
corporation under the complete control of a shareholder committed an unjust or
inequitable act, virtually every close corporation could be pierced when sued, as
nearly every lawsuit sets forth a form of unjust or inequitable action and close
corporations are by definition controlled by an individual or small group of
shareholders.").
9 6 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 544-45.
9 Id. at 545. The court also ignored the insurer bad faith issue. Since the case had
reached the Ohio Supreme Court on a certified conflict, the court did not address
the question. Id. at 512 n.2.
198 id.
'Id. (emphasis added).
200 Id. ("Courts should apply this limited expansion cautiously toward the goal of
piercing the corporate veil only in instances of extreme shareholder misconduct.").
01 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 546 (Pfiefer, J., dissenting).
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pulled from the air. Is there a notable distinction between an "unlawful" and
an "illegal" act? Not that the majority identifies. The words appear to be
two ways of saying the same thing. Potato, potahto, illegal, unlawful - let's
call the whole thing off."2 02
IV. THE AFTERMATH: IS OHIO BETTER OFF POST-DOMBROSKl?
The short answer is corporate law in Ohio benefitted from Dombroski.
However, the benefit is qualified. Since Dombroski, there has not been a
significant judicial discussion of the addition of the phrase "similarly
unlawful act" to the second step of the Belvedere test.2 0 3 Most cases have
easily fallen into the pre-Dombroski categories of fraudulent/illegal or
simply amounting to unjust actions that cannot lead to veil piercing.204 No
court has been willing to draw a line between inequality and
fraudulent/illegal conduct to define the outer boundaries of veil piercing in
Ohio.205 Despite the lack of judicial response, the Dombroski court
indicated the direction corporate law is heading in Ohio enough to permit
meaningful speculation regarding the court's goals. Examining the policy of
limited liability in conjunction with the court's new language indicates the
Dombroski rule is a standard that permits piercing when conduct is in the
ambit of fraudulent or illegal activity.
Consider the structure of conduct the Ohio Supreme Court created for
veil piercing cases. On a hypothetical spectrum, on one extreme is fraud or
illegal conduct and at the other is simple unfairness. Allowing judges nearly
boundless discretion to pierce the veil when there is unfairness is a fairly
liberal piercing policy. 206 If the Ohio Supreme Court permitted mere
202 Id. at 547 (Pfiefer, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 545.
204 Compare Transition Healthcare Assoc., Inc. v. Tri-State Health Investors, LLC,
306 Fed. Appx 273, 282 n.14 (6th Cir. 2009) (denying veil piercing claim under
Dombroski) with Advantage Bank v. Waldo Pub LLC, No. 9-08-67, 2009 WL
1664781 (Ohio App. 3d Dist. June 15, 2009) (denying veil piercing under previous
Belvedere standard).
205 Some conduct, such as a simple contract breach, falls beyond the second
Belvedere prong. See Connolly v. Malkamaki, No. 2001 -L- 124, 2002 WL
31813040, at *6 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. Dec. 13, 2002). Other actions which are
similar to fraud or illegal conduct fall within the test.
206 One unspoken goal of the Ohio Supreme Court may have been to drastically
limit the piercing rate in Ohio. Professor Thompson's statistical break down of veil
piercing cases indicates that while the total number of cases seeking veil piercing is
not huge compared to other states, Ohio ranks near the top for successful veil
piercing. Thompson, supra note 2, at 1051. Close to sixty percent of claims
seeking veil piercing as a remedy are successful in Ohio. Id. (noting a 57.14%
success rate). The majority in Dombroski may have simply wanted to bring Ohio
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unfairness to satisfy the test, the result would be every corporation's veil
would be pierced in almost every situation.207 In Dombroski, the Ohio
Supreme Court nixed one end of the spectrum concluding that simple
unfairness forced Ohio corporations and shareholders to internalize far too
- 208* *
much risk. At the same time, limiting veil piercing to cases of fraud or
illegal activity "insulates shareholders when they abuse the corporate form
to commit acts that are as objectionable as fraud or illegality." 20 9 The court
concluded the conduct test needed to be realigned and inserted a third point
into the conduct spectrum: similar unlawful acts.2 10
The court indicated that this new third point on the spectrum falls
remarkably close to the conduct already described. First, the standard
covers only "egregious wrongs" committed by shareholders. 2 1 1 Second, the
court emphasized its point by urging caution in applying its new test.21 2
The court's language is indefinite, but indicates that its goal is to prevent
serious misuse of the corporate form without any specific examples of the
activity it is concerned with deterring.213 The Ohio Supreme Court's other
recent veil piercing case supports the trend of stringently limiting the
applicability of veil piercing. In Minno v. Pro-Fab, Inc., the Ohio Supreme
Court held parties could not use the doctrine of veil piercing to hold a
second corporation liable for the debts of a sister corporation.2 14 In other
words, a party could not reverse veil pierce by using a common shareholder
of two corporations as a conduit between the corporation being sued and the
corporation having the capital to satisfy the judgment.2 15 While the ability
to reverse pierce had never been recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court
prior to Minno, the case represents the court's enthusiasm for providing
more security for limited liability. But the question remains what does the
new language specifically add to Belvedere?
into line with most other states. The national average rate for successful state court
piercing is just under forty percent. Id. at 1049.
07 Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 546 (Ohio 2008).
208 Id. at 544.
209 Id. at 545.
210 id
211 id212 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545 ("Courts should apply this limited expansion
cautiously toward the goal of piercing the corporate veil only in instances of
extreme shareholder misconduct.").
213 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 544 (noting that piercing should be applied "only in
case of .. . exceptional circumstances").
214 Minno v. Pro-Fab, Inc., 905 N.E.2d 613, 617 (Ohio 2009).
215 Id. (The Court declined to permit reverse piercing because a "wrongful act
committed by one sister corporation might have been instigated by the
corporation's owners, but it could not have been instigated by the corporation's
sister.").
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The easy answer is misrepresentation because it is conduct that is
the closest to fraud or illegality. The contractarian theory indicates that only
under certain circumstances should there be an exception to limited
liability: specifically when there is misrepresentation or fraud by the
shareholder.21 6 The Belvedere test explicitly includes fraud. The additional
language from Dombroski may have been added to include actions such as
misrepresentation. Though fraud and misrepresentation are similar,
misrepresentation is a lesser standard.217 In most states, common law fraud
is a difficult standard to prove. In Ohio, there are six essential elements to
proving fraud: representation or concealment of a fact, materiality,
knowledge or recklessness with regard to its falseness, intent to mislead,
justifiable reliance, and injury.218 Misrepresenting a fact is only one part to
the specific offense of fraud. Since misrepresentation is only an element of
fraud, it generally covers much broader conduct.219
The distinction between the two standards results from the scienter
requirement. Misrepresentation may only require confusion, as opposed to a
positive misstatement. 22 0 For example in My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., the court held the corporation's veil could be
216 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 503.
217 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1075 n.53. The standards must have some
significant difference. If the plaintiff had a viable fraud case, he or she would
plead it. Id. However, since fraud evidence is difficult to find, most parties
attempting to pierce the corporate veil settle for misrepresentation. Cathy S.
Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Focusing the Inquiry, 55
DEN. L.J. 1, 31 (1978) (noting that "fraud is difficult to prove, and the quantum of
evidence available in most corporate veil cases is considerably smaller than would
be required to carry the burden in a fraud claim.").
218 Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indemn. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 944 (Ohio
1992), overruled on other grounds recognized by Morland v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.
266, 2000 WL 184600 (Ohio App. 7th Dist. Feb. 3, 2000). There is an indication
from some Ohio courts that the scienter element of fraud can be satisfied if the
party making the representation should have known of its falseness. See
Fenstermaker v. Elwood, 479 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Ohio App. 3d Dist. 1984).
219 The Second Restatement of Torts makes a similar distinction. A fraudulent
misrepresentation occurs when the maker "knows or believes that the matter is not
as he represents it to be [or] does not have confidence in the accuracy of his
representation." All fraud is misrepresentation, but not all misrepresentation is
fraud. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (2009).
220 Krendl & Krendl, supra note 217, at 32-33. For example, in My Bread Baking
Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., the court held the corporation's veil court be
pierced when the plaintiff only showed that the defendant ran several corporations
from the same location and used common names. My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 748, 753 (Mass. 1968). See also Zaist v.
Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 552 (Conn. 1967).
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pierced when the plaintiff only showed that the defendant ran several
corporations from the same location and used common names.22 1 The
defendant was the dominant shareholder in a parent corporation that had
several incorporated subsidiaries.222 The defendant issued statements from
his primary corporation on behalf of each subsidiary to the plaintiff who
wished to distribute baking goods to the corporation.22 3 Based on the
defendant's communication, the plaintiff believed he was contracting with
the primary corporation for distribution, not the subsidiaries.224 The
defendant did not indicate on which corporation's behalf he was acting
when the communications were sent.22 5 The court indicated that the
"serious ambiguity" resulting from the situation, justified disregarding the
corporate entity.2 2 6 As a result, misrepresentation could pierce the veil,
though it fell short of what would commonly be classified as fraud. The
addition to Belvedere's conduct element is formulated to include
misrepresentation - actions which are not themselves fraudulent, but similar
in their nature and impact.22 7
The addition of misrepresentation to the test still leaves unresolved
issues. After all, if the Dombroski court had only meant to include
misrepresentation in its analysis, it would have explicitly added it. Instead,
the court seemed determined that the law would retain some uncertainty.
The lack of specific examples may provide one simple explanation for the
court's additional language: additional discretion to judges. While the court
could have simply listed the variety of acts which will satisfy the conduct
element, doing so would bind judges from creating the most just remedy.
The uncertainty of veil piercing has significant roots in its equitable
foundation - judges ultimately see that justice is done to the litigating
parties before considering ex ante issues. While Dombroski seriously
limited the discretion of judges in veil piercing cases, the justices' addition
of "similar unlawful acts" might indicate a reservation of judgment for
221 My Bread Baking Co., 233 N.E.2d at 753.
222 id
223 Id. In this case, it seems entirely reasonable that the plaintiff would have been
confused by the actions of the defendant. The defendant's actions lead the plaintiff
to believe he was dealing with the parent corporation when in reality he was
forming a series of agreements with each subsidiary.
224 id
225 d226 Id. at 752. While the court seemed to indicate the lack of formalities between
corporations was the issue, failure to keep entities distinct was not the problem.
Instead, it exemplified the corporation's misrepresentation to its creditor that the
creditor was dealing with the primary corporation, not its retail subsidiaries.
227 This lesser standard makes veil piercing available in cases where the parties
seeking to pierce the veil is unsophisticated or unable to bear the expenses of
conducting a detailed financial audit of the corporation. Krendl & Krendl, supra
note 217, at 33-34.
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situations that have yet to be anticipated. In other words, the court retained
an ace in the hole, the ability to decide unforeseen cases in a matter which
the justices believe is most representative of fairness, but may fall outside
of the strict legal framework of the Belvedere test. 228
Dombroski both helped and hurt corporate law in Ohio. The Ohio
Supreme Court in cases like Dombroski and Minno seemed determined to
bring Ohio more into line with the attitudes of other states when it comes to
limited liability. But, the court was also determined to keep equity
somewhere in the equation. While this approach has the advantage of
providing flexibility to judges in veil piercing cases, it creates the same
hindrance that plagues veil piercing in every context: a lack of
predictability. To the businessman, predictability is key to successful
private ordering.229 While the Dombroski decision may have satisfied the
Ohio Supreme Court, its leaves some concrete issues unresolved for Ohio's
corporations.
V. CONCLUSION
Ohio is home to over 90,000 incorporated business entities. 23 0 Of
these, sixty-one percent are operated by a sole shareholder.23 1 As a result,
228 Another possible interpretation of Dombroski was that its formulation of
Belvedere was specifically applicable to the tort of insurer bad faith. See Jason
Cummings, Ohio Supreme Court Holds that Insurer's Alleged Bad Faith
Insufficient to Pierce Corporate Veil to Holding Company, MolIus MANNING &
MARTIN LLP (2007), http://www.mmmlaw.com/industry/08Winter6.html (noting
that "under this modified version of the piercing the corporate veil test, an Ohio
court likely will hold that an insurer's bad faith in denying a policyholder's claim is
insufficient to pierce the corporate veil and hold the shareholders liable.").
229 Part of this problem centers around the rules versus standard debate. While
clear bright line rules permit parties to plan behavior with readily predictable
outcomes, some bad conduct escapes coverage because of loopholes. Veil piercing
is an archetypal standard: it leaves judges great discretion and flexibility but lacks
predictability which ultimately decreases the utility of the corporate form. See
generally, Thompson, supra note 2, at 1036.
2o See Ohio Dept. of Taxation, Tax Data Series, Corporation Franchise Tax for
Tax Year 2009,
http://tax.ohio.gov/divisions/comnunications/publications/annualreports/2008_A
anualReport/documents/corporationfranchise tax.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
231 See Merit Brief for Amicus Curiae Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, Ohio
Chamber of Commerce, The Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of
Independent Businesses, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation Supporting
Appellants at 1, Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538 (Ohio 2008). The
estimate of 52,000 is conservative. Corporations with less than ten shareholders
are equally vulnerable to veil piercing. Expanding to include the number of
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over 52,000 individual shareholders in Ohio are potentially personally
vulnerable to creditors.232 The Ohio Supreme Court allowed most of those
shareholders to sleep a little better thanks to the additional protection by
Dombroski. But other than relaxing the sole shareholder's state of mind,
what can businesses take away from the decision? Entrepreneurs know that
the Ohio Supreme Court is concerned with reinforcing limited liability to
give real protection to shareholders. But, it is unclear how much security
the Ohio Supreme Court is willing to provide.23 3 The uncertainty of the law
leaves business planners in a pickle: those wishing to have the insulation of
limited liability must decide whether to incur the transactional costs
associated with incorporating while knowing that those costs may be in
vain. In particular, this may be a significant decision for small business
owners or corporations with a number of subsidiaries who wish to
appropriately partition assets among riskier enterprises. The uncertainty
from Dombroski will likely make business entities unwilling to expend the
time and resources to incorporate when there is no certain benefit at the end
of the day. The resulting increase in the cost of capital makes risky projects
that have positive value difficult to fund.2 34
While this is not the ideal situation, corporations are not without
solutions to avoid the issue altogether. The most controllable part of
Belvedere is the first prong that requires control or domination of the
corporate entity by the shareholder.23 5 The basic rule is corporations and
shareholders are separate entities under the law and should be treated
accordingly. Officers and directors of corporations should be diligent in
their attention to corporate formalities. 23 6 It is insufficient to simply file for
corporations with ten or fewer shareholders would greatly inflate the number of
shareholders vulnerable.
232 id
233 Dombroski came to the Ohio Supreme Court on a certified conflict from the
Seventh District not a discretionary appeal, which means the Ohio Supreme Court
did not affirmatively choose to take the case. Rather, the court was compelled to
decide the issue. There was no affirmative decision by the court to take a proactive
stance in this area. Short of a series of mandatory appeals hashing out the exact
boundaries of veil piercing, it may be a while before the court provides further
guidance on the issue.
234 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 97. Business owners use subsidiaries to
segregate riskier assets into an incorporated subsidiary which is owned wholly by a
parent corporation. The parent enjoys the benefits of the subsidiary and is insulated
from liability if the assets of the subsidiary are insufficient to cover any claims
against the business. Robert B. Thompson, Agency Law and Asset Partitioning, 71
U. CiN. L. REv. 1321, 1324-25 (2003).
235 Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n. v. R.E. Roark Cos., Inc., 617
N.E.2d 1075, 1086 (Ohio 1993).
236 Legal practitioners should be scrupulous with the formation of the corporation
and be certain to follow all the requirements set forth in the Ohio Revised Code,
Chapter 1701. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.04-13 (West 2009). Directors
2010 "There's a Change in the Status Quo": 349
Corporate Veil Piercing in Ohio after
Dombroski v. WellPoint
incorporation without issuing shares or electing directors. 2 37  The
corporation should have separate accounts from the shareholders.238
Similarly, if a customer makes a payment to the business, the client should
make the check out to the corporation and not a shareholder.2 3 9 The
corporation's property should not be diverted from corporate use for the
personal benefit of the shareholder.2 40 Corporations should not pay personal
bills from the company ledger or corporate obligations with personal
funds.24 1 If the corporation is suffering from illiquidity and cannot pay
obligations as they come due, deposit a personal check into the company
242bank account - never pay corporate obligations from personal accounts.
The corporation's financial officer should ensure these personal "loans" to
the corporation are recorded in the company's financial records.
Avoiding fraud or illegality from Belvedere's second prong is a
straightforward requirement: shareholders should do not do anything
illegal!2 4 3 However, misrepresentation is not as easy to predict or evade.
Parties should make clear the precise terms of agreements. The corporations
should ensure that the creditor is aware of which entities are responsible for
payment. For example, the use of overt signage or forms that clearly and
explicitly display the corporation's name and location eliminate any
potential confusion. 24
For firms with subsidiaries, rather than incurring the costs of
incorporation with no certain benefit, the subsidiary may be incorporated as
a limited liability company (LLC) instead of a corporation. A limited
liability company functions like a corporation in terms of its debts and
should be elected in accordance with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.55 (West
2009). Board meeting should be held and minutes of those meetings maintained
under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.61 (West 2009).
237 Teri Rasmussen, Piercing the Corporate Veil - What It Means and How to
Avoid It, OHIO PRACTICAL BUS. LAW, Nov. 25, 2007,
http://www.ohiopracticalbusinesslaw.com/2007/ 1/articles/collections/piercing-
the-corporate-veil-what-it-means-and-how-to-avoid-it/.
238 David B. Cathcart, Michael R. Tucci, & Jennifer E. Gross, Avoid the Corporate
Veil Getting Pierced - Protecting from Personal Liability for Corporate
Obligations, MANSOuR, GAVIN, GERLACK, & MANOS Co. L.P.A., Dec. 15, 2008,
http://www.mggmlpa.com/news-full_article.php?id=44&flag=news&from=archive
&year-2008.
239 id
240 Taylor Steel, Inc. v. Keeton, 417 F.3d 598, 598 (6th Cir. 2005).
241 Rasmussen, supra note 237.
242 Id
243 Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n. v. R.E. Roark Cos., Inc., 617
N.E.2d 1075, 1086 (Ohio 1993).
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obligations, but like a partnership for tax purposes.24 5 Thus, LLCs enjoy the
same limited liability status as a corporation 2 46 and LLC's veil may be
247
pierced like any limited liability entity. However, the transactional costs
of that status are much lower. Corporations must maintain formalities, both
at formation and as part of the continuing operations and management of
the company. However, there are far fewer costs for an LLC since an LLC
is easier to form and maintain. 24 8 These lower transactional costs justify the
added protection of limited liability. While the veil of an LLC can still be
pierced, the members incur fewer costs for protection and prevent parties
from using the 'formalities' factor from the veil piercing test.249 As a result,
some corporations can take measures to add a layer of protection at a
fraction of the cost.
Despite these practical safeguards, the issue of veil piercing can be
a hand-wringing topic to the small business owner. The prospect of
personal liability for the debts and obligations of the corporation is a risk no
entrepreneur wants to run. The ability to run a business free and clear of
personal liability is a tremendous benefit. Veil piercing should not be used
as a tax on the unwary shareholder or the entrepreneur. 250 The law in Ohio
has provided more security for the owners of small businesses through its
recent decision in Dombroski. While not as clear as it could be, the
Belvedere standard as modified in Dombroski does help secure limited
liability for corporations with fewer shareholders and puts corporate law in
Ohio in the right direction. Only time will tell if veil piercing in Ohio will
solidify into a concrete and predictable rule which entrepreneurs can
confidently rely.
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2005).
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personally liable for the debts of the company "solely by reason of being a member
or manager of the limited liability company.").
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(1991) (noting that "LLC[s] lack[] centralized management and operating under a
statute requiring few formalities.").
249 However, other factors may become more significant due to the general
formalities. Id. Some states have dealt with this issue by passing statutes which
remove formalities as a consideration for piercing the veil of an LLC. See CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1702(c) (West 2010).
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